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Abstract 
 
Previous research has found that people frequently provide 
incorrect predictions about the path of moving objects when given 
an idealised physics problem to solve. The aim of this research was 
to explore whether these incorrect predictions are due to the 
application of an incorrect naïve physics theory, whether incorrect 
perceptions generated from past experiences lead to 
misconceptions of how moving objects behave, or whether it is a 
combination of both. Thirty-one participants volunteered to take 
part in the experiment which followed a two (experience 
congruent/incongruent with naïve physics theory) by two (carried 
versus free-moving object) within-subject design. The dependent 
variable was participant response (straight down or curved 
forwards). Results of the study revealed that participants provided 
answers both consistent and inconsistent with the naïve physics 
theory. This suggests that responses were primarily elicited 
through the retrieval of associatively-mediated memories of similar 
scenarios - some of which contain perceptual illusions. Possible 
methodological limitations and alternative theoretical explanations 
are discussed, along with practical and theoretical implications for 
education and learning. 
 
Introduction 
 
Objects are constantly moving all around us. Therefore, it 
seems realistic that an individual should be able to correctly 
predict the path of a moving object (Zago & Lacquaniti, 
2005). However, research has found that people are 
frequently incorrect in their predictions when given an 
idealised problem to solve (McCloskey, Caramazza & 
Green, 1980; McCloskey, Washburn & Felch, 1983; 
McLaren, Wood & McLaren, 2013). The aim of this study is 
to investigate whether conscious reasoning leads people to 
apply an incorrect theory to basic physics problems (a 
propositional account, cf. Mitchell, De Houwer and 
Lovibond, 2009) or whether automatic associative memories 
(McLaren, 2011) generate misperceptions of how moving 
objects behave (the associative account), or even if a 
combination of both is needed to explain these predictions 
(a dual-process account (McLaren et al., 2014)). We first 
introduce the on-going debate as to whether human mental 
life is best explained in propositional terms, associative 
terms or both, before going on to consider other related 
examples of problem solving in humans (and other animals) 
which may cast light on this research question. 
 
Both the propositional (see also Shanks, 2007) and dual-
process (McLaren et al., 2014) approaches agree that human 
learning incorporates a conscious, calculating component, 
and that past experiences play a crucial role. However, 
disagreement exists on whether human learning can be 
explained by one unitary set of processes or requires 
multiple processes for its full characterisation. The dual-
process approach refers to two modes of processing which 
are fundamentally distinct: associative processes which 
create links between representations without conscious 
knowledge and regardless of the individual’s intentions, and 
cognitive processes which consciously employ rules and 
reasoning (McLaren, Green & Mackintosh, 1994). It is 
argued that whilst both human and non-human species are 
capable of associative learning, humans alone possess rule-
based processes which allow logical reasoning (Povinelli, 
2004). However, Mitchell, De Houwer and Lovibond (2009) 
argue that evidence for these two distinct learning processes 
is ambiguous. They state that rule-based learning and 
associative learning are part of a combined system where 
associative learning relies on conscious, effortful and 
calculated processes, rather than implicit, automatic 
processes. 
 
The present study explores all three of the theoretical 
approaches discussed above, in relation to how people solve 
physics problems. However, the working hypothesis is that 
associative processes, in the form of associative memory, 
primarily drive responses to physics problems in most 
people. Mental rotation tasks share similarities to the basic 
physics problems used in this current study, in requiring a 
simulation of the physical world (Neiworth & Rilling, 
1987). Therefore, they provide a solid starting point for 
exploring whether associative memory plays a primary role 
in responding to these types of problems. During a 
discrimination task involving shape rotations, Shepard and 
Metzler (1971) found an increased reaction time for larger 
rotations. This linear relationship led Shepard and Metzler 
to conclude that people have a general purpose rotation 
ability. They suggested that participants created mental 
representations of the first image and then, when shown the 
second image, mentally rotated it to match the first. 
However, something resembling mental rotation has also 
been demonstrated in pigeons (Neiworth & Rilling, 1987). If 
humans alone possess rule-based processes which allow 
logical reasoning (Povinelli, 2004), then mental rotation in 
pigeons might suggest a role for associative processes in 
these tasks. Pigeons were trained to respond to images of 
clocks with rotating hands and were then tested in a 
discrimination task. Neiworth and Rilling found the pigeons 
not only performed above chance when discriminating 
rotations they had been trained on, but also in trials 
involving rotations they had not been trained on. The 
pigeons appeared to know where the clock hand should 
reappear given the time that had gone by, and were able to 
indicate whether it was right or wrong when the clock hand 
reappeared. These findings provide support for the primary 
role of associative memory because the pigeons had 
considerable experience of successive events during 
training, and, as a result, were later able to extrapolate novel 
rotations similar to the rotations they had previously 
experienced. It can, therefore, be argued that it is also 
extrapolation based on experience that enables humans to 
solve similar problems. Rather than utilising a general-
purpose rotation ability, people’s ability to apparently 
mentally rotate objects might instead come from their vast 
experience of objects in different orientations in the 
environment (Edelman & Bülthoff, 1992). A corollary of 
this position is that if people’s responses are driven by 
associative memory and experience, then changing 
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contextual variables (i.e. the surface features of the task) 
should potentially change people’s answers. We make use 
of this logic in the study reported here.  
 
Previous research on naïve physics problems has helped 
inform the current research. According to McCloskey, 
Caramazza and Green (1980), when presented with 
problems involving a ball bearing entering a horizontally 
positioned curved tube, people tend to utilise the belief that 
the ball will exit the tube with a “curvy impetus”. The 
majority of participants verbally indicated in a later 
interview that they believed the ball would acquire a force 
or momentum in the tube that would cause it to continue to 
travel in a curved motion upon its exit, gradually losing 
momentum until the trajectory became straight. This led 
McCloskey et al. (1980) to conclude that participants were 
using a naïve theory of motion. McCloskey, Washburn and 
Felch (1983) later provided evidence for a naïve physics 
theory in problems involving falling objects. Participants 
appeared to apply the incorrect non-Newtonian theory that, 
whilst free-moving objects will fall in a curved motion, 
carried objects will fall straight down. McCloskey et al. 
(1983) suggest that a perceptual illusion occurs when people 
observe a carried object falling. For instance, when an 
individual drops something whilst cycling, the object ends 
up behind them due to the cyclist maintaining a constant 
speed before noticing the object has fallen. Whilst the 
cyclist continues at a constant speed,  the object gradually 
loses speed as soon as it starts to fall. Although the object 
falls forward in a curved motion, the observer is likely to 
believe that the object fell straight down (or backwards) 
because it is behind the cyclist in their frame of reference.  
 
Whilst it appears that participants are consistently getting 
basic physics problems wrong due to explicitly applying an 
incorrect non-Newtonian theory, there is the alternative 
possibility that these responses are primarily elicited 
through the retrieval of associatively-mediated memories of 
similar scenarios - some of which contain perceptual 
illusions (Zago & Lacquaniti, 2005). Participants may later 
offer an explanation congruent with a naïve physics theory 
to justify their reasoning, in an attempt to rationalise their 
responses in a scientific way. In order to provide evidence 
for the use of associatively-mediated memories in these 
problems, it needs to be demonstrated that individuals can 
produce systematically different answers to essentially the 
same problem (Sloman, 1996) when the contextual cues 
accompanying it are varied. If participants cannot explain 
their answers using a consistent rule, then this indicates 
automatic associative processing followed by conscious 
reasoning to justify their initial automatic responses.  
 
A study by McLaren, Wood and McLaren (2013) explored 
whether experience is primary in explaining why people 
incorrectly predict the directions of moving objects. 
Participants were required to complete a questionnaire 
containing eight physics problems, each concerning falling 
objects, and were asked to indicate which path they thought 
each falling object would take. They found that participants 
gave responses that were both consistent and inconsistent 
with the naïve physics theory, depending on the context of 
the problem. In a series of structurally identical but 
contextually varied scenarios, around half of the carried 
objects were predicted (on the basis of extrapolation from 
experience) to fall in a curved forwards motion whilst the 
others were predicted to fall straight down. Equally, around 
half of the free-moving objects were predicted to fall 
straight down whilst the others were predicted to fall in a 
curved forwards motion. A naïve physics view would 
predict that all the carried objects fall straight down, and all 
the free-moving objects follow a curved forwards path. 
McLaren et al. (2013) argued that if participants’ responses 
were produced by applying a naïve physics theory, the 
theory would have to be consistently applied across all 
scenarios. In fact, the variation in contextual cues led to 
responses that were consistent with their predictions rather 
than the naïve physics view. Therefore, a more feasible 
explanation for the responses is that participants were 
primarily responding to these problems using their own 
experiences of events similar in structure or context to 
predict the paths of the falling objects. 
 
The present research was predicated on the existence of 
both propositional and associative processes in humans. 
Whilst it might appear that people apply an incorrect naïve 
physics theory when solving basic physics problems 
(McCloskey et al., 1980; McCloskey et al., 1983) the 
presence of the inconsistent responses seen in McLaren et 
al.’s (2013) study suggests that associative memory plays a 
significant role in generating these incorrect predictions. 
Thus, it is possible that participants’ responses are based on 
associative memory rather than propositional inference or 
reasoning and that naïve physics accounts are later presented 
as a reason for these responses (i.e. an epiphenomenon). 
This study aims to extend McLaren et al.’s (2013) work in 
order to determine whether results in support of the 
associative account can be replicated under more controlled 
conditions. In order to do this, a number of possible 
weaknesses and limitations that were identified in McLaren 
et al.’s (2013) study were eliminated. Firstly, the number of 
possible paths of falling objects that participants could pick 
from was reduced from five to two in order to simplify the 
analysis of participants’ responses. Secondly, the number of 
problems was increased from eight to twelve to improve 
reliability. Thirdly, each image was carefully refined to 
avoid any confounding characteristics such as motion lines 
and object position – these are now equated across 
problems. Fourthly, each participant was tested on a 
computer individually and then interviewed afterwards 
rather than given a questionnaire to complete in class. This 
was to strengthen validity of the experiment by avoiding 
confounding variables such as responses of classmates at the 
same table and noisy distractions. The interview was done to 
ensure enough information was provided to generate reliable 
qualitative data. If these findings show responses that are 
both consistent and inconsistent with the naïve physics 
theory, depending on the context in which they are 
presented, this will support the theory that people are 
making use of associative memories when responding to 
these problems.  
 
Experiment  
 
Method 
Participants 
 
Thirty-one participants volunteered to take part in the 
experiment. Participants consisted of 17 females and 14 
males (M=26.45 years, SD=8.37) living in Exeter and the 
surrounding areas (15 undergraduate students, 5 college 
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students, 10 professionals and 1 postgraduate student). All 
participants had a GCSE in Physics and one had an A Level 
in Physics. Final year psychology students with prior 
knowledge of the theories explored in this study were 
excluded from participation.  
 
Materials and Design 
 
The experiment followed a 2 (experience congruent/ 
incongruent with naïve physics theory) by 2 (carried/free-
moving object) within-subject design. The dependent 
variable was participant response (straight down/curved 
forwards). Each participant was presented with the same 12 
basic physics problems, constructed using Microsoft Word 
and Microsoft PowerPoint and programmed using SuperLab 
software on a Macintosh computer. The experiment 
contained what was essentially the same physics problem 
presented in 12 different ways, using different contextual 
features. All of the problems were framed around falling 
objects travelling at the same speed. Six problems involved 
carried objects and the other six problems involved free-
moving objects.  These two types of problems were divided 
into subcategories, based on whether the predicted answer 
was congruent or incongruent with the naïve physics theory. 
Therefore, the four categories of problems were: Carried – 
Congruent (e.g. Figure 1), Carried – Incongruent (e.g. 
Figure 2), Free-moving – Congruent (e.g. Figure 3) and 
Free-Moving – Incongruent (e.g. Figure 4).  
 
There were three problems in each of the four categories. 
Carried – Congruent: a seagull in flight dropping an ice-
cream, a plane dropping a crate and a running student 
dropping a book; Carried – Incongruent: a swinging monkey 
dropping a banana, a plane dropping a bouncing bomb and a 
running cricketer dropping a ball; Free-Moving – 
Congruent: a cannonball fired off a cliff, a skier approaching 
a crevasse and a toy car falling off a table; Free-Moving 
Incongruent: a river flowing off a cliff, a skater dropping 
into a half-pipe and a toy train falling off a broken track. 
The congruent problems were based on problems used in 
previous research that resulted in responses congruent with 
the naïve physics theory (i.e. straight down for carried 
objects and curved forwards for free-moving objects). The 
incongruent problems, which were designed to elicit 
responses incongruent with the naive physics theory (i.e. 
curved forwards for carried objects and straight down for 
free-moving objects), were selected based on the research 
team’s own visualisations of how the objects would appear 
to behave from associated experiences (e.g. a skater can be 
associated with dropping straight down into a half-pipe). 
 
Procedure 
 
Firstly, participants were given a consent form to sign, 
which briefed them on the procedure of the experiment and 
their right to withdraw at any time. They then read the 
onscreen instructions as follows: “You are about to view a 
series of scenarios in which objects are seen falling to the 
ground. Firstly, look at the scenario and decide which path 
you think the object will take on its journey, and then, from 
the two choices offered, select which path you think most 
resembles the one you thought of. Indicate your choice by 
pressing the corresponding number on the keyboard. For 
example, if you think Path 1 is most similar to the path you 
thought of, press the key ‘1’. When making your choice, 
please ignore the effects of air/wind resistance and friction. 
All objects are travelling at the same speed (Speed V). When 
you have made your choice, let the experimenter know. You 
will then be asked a couple of brief questions before moving 
on to the next scenario. Please give as full an answer as 
possible. If you are happy to continue, press the space bar 
to begin the experiment.” 
 
       
       
       
       
 
The experiment began with one of the 12 scenarios 
appearing on the screen. Participants were provided with 
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information about the scenario (see Figures 1-4) and were 
then asked to press the space bar to see the possible paths of 
the falling object (see Figure 5). These were shown side by 
side, with the object falling straight down or curved 
forwards. Participants were asked to select the path they 
thought was most likely. They were then asked to let the 
experimenter know that they had made their decision. The 
experimenter responded by asking a set list of questions 
about the scenario: “What was happening in the scenario?”, 
“Which answer did you select?” and “Why did you select 
that answer?” The 12 scenarios were presented in random 
order to prevent bias. 
  
Figure 5. Example of choices provided. 
 
At the end of the experiment, participants were asked if 
they followed any specific rules to help them complete the 
experiment and if they had any general comments about the 
experiment. Participants 13 to 31 were also asked if they felt 
their approach changed at all during the experiment. This 
was because it became apparent during the experiment that 
some participants felt they were trying to apply a rule at first 
and then they later noticed their responses were inconsistent 
with the rule they had said they were applying. The 
experimenter then verbally debriefed participants about the 
nature of the study. The duration of the experiment was 
approximately 15 minutes for each participant.  
 
Results 
 
As a first step, the data was analysed using a 4 (condition) 
x 2 (response) contingency chi-square test to see if the 
condition (carried-congruent, carried-incongruent, free-
congruent or free-incongruent) had a significant effect on 
the responses given (straight down or curved forwards). A 
contingency chi-square test was chosen because it 
investigates whether there is a significant relationship 
between two variables. A significance level of p = .05 was 
used for all statistical tests. The results of the 
analysis,	𝜒#(3) 	= 66.94, p < .001 suggest that there was a 
highly significant effect. In other words, the responses given 
were not independent of the condition. As the condition did 
appear to have an effect on the responses given (see Table 
1), a number of 2 x 2 contingency chi-square analyses were 
carried out to determine the nature of this effect. Collapsing 
over carried/free-moving, 	𝜒#(1) 	= 2.43, p = .119 (ns) 
indicates that congruency had no main effect. A similar 
analysis for carried/free-moving after collapsing over 
congruency gave a 	𝜒#(1) 	= 3.89, p = .049, which suggests 
there was a marginally significant relationship between this 
factor and response. Straight down was the most common 
response for carried problems and curved forwards was the 
most popular response for free-moving problems. This 
finding is consistent with a naïve physics effect.  
 
 
However, a naïve physics theory predicts a preference for 
straight down responses for carried objects and curved 
forwards responses for free-moving objects, regardless of 
congruency classification. These results were further broken 
down to investigate whether carried versus free-moving had 
an effect on response when looking at congruent and 
incongruent problems independently. The	𝜒#(1) = 48.31, p 
< .001 for congruent problems and the 	𝜒#(1) = 16.89, p < 
.001 for incongruent problems suggest that carried versus 
free-moving had a highly significant but quite opposing 
effect on responses for both congruent and incongruent 
problems (see Figure 6). It can clearly be seen from Figure 6 
that, whilst it is possible to get a pattern of results consistent 
with a naïve physics theory (congruent problem data shown 
in blue), it is also possible to construct similar problems that 
elicit the reverse pattern of results. In the congruent 
problems, carried objects tended to produce a straight down 
response and free-moving objects tended to produce a 
curved forwards response. Conversely, the incongruent 
problems, revealed the opposite pattern of responses,  
directly contradicting the naïve physics theory.  
 
Figure 6. This graph represents the response difference score 
(No. curved forwards – No. straight down) for each of the four 
conditions, where a positive score denotes a bias for the curved 
forwards response over the straight down response. 
  
Discussion 
 
The aim of this study was to determine whether 
experiences are primary in predicting the answer of basic 
physics problems. In order to do this, an extension of 
McLaren et al.’s (2013) study was developed. Specifically, 
the interest was whether participants responded both 
consistently and inconsistently with the naïve physics theory 
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depending on the context in which the problems were 
presented. The hypothesis was that associative processes in 
the form of associative memory primarily drive responses to 
physics problems in relatively naïve participants. Therefore, 
it was predicted that participants would provide answers 
both consistent and inconsistent with the naïve physics 
theory based on congruency categorisation. The results of 
the study revealed that they did.  
 
Evidence for Associative and Cognitive Processes? 
 
Whilst we have strong evidence that contextual variables 
can influence the responses to essentially the same physics 
problem, a result which strengthens the case for associative 
memory influencing these responses, we also have a main 
effect of carried/free-moving that is consistent with a naïve 
physics view. Admittedly this effect could be due to the fact 
that memories of carried objects have a general tendency to 
elicit a straight down response (and more than a curved 
forwards response) because of an incorrect perception 
generated from past experience (McLaren et al., 2013). If 
the carrier of the object is still moving at a constant speed 
when the object falls then it will appear that the object has 
fallen straight down. Nevertheless, this is a post-hoc 
explanation of this finding, which would have undoubtedly 
been predicted by a naïve physics account. Thus, we must 
acknowledge the possibility of a more cognitive component 
to the responses made to our problems. 
 
When exploring the qualitative data, it becomes clear that 
many participants do offer something reminiscent of a naïve 
physics theory when asked to explain their responses. 
However, the theory provided is inconsistently applied, as 
congruent questions are predominately explained using a 
naïve physics theory, whereas incongruent problems are 
predominately explained by an appeal to experience. If 
participants were consciously applying different rules in 
different situations, then they should be able to explain these 
diverse rules afterwards. However, this was not the case.  
For instance, in the seagull problem, the majority of 
participants’ explanations were of the form: “I thought it 
was most likely to fall straight down or backwards because 
the bird is in motion but the ice cream is not”. This sounds 
like a naïve physics theory, but on the other hand, in the 
skateboarder problem, the majority of participants’ 
explanations did not refer to theory but to experience: “If 
you see skaters on a ramp they usually go straight down”. 
Other incongruent problems are explained using an 
alternative theory. For instance, some participants failed to 
apply the straight down belief to carried objects but instead 
attempted to apply the rules of Newtonian physics by simply 
mentioning gravity: “gravity will pull it straight down”. 
These inconsistent explanations for responses suggest that 
participants are automatically responding to problems and 
later coming up with rules when asked to explain why they 
selected their responses.  At the end of the experiment, 
many participants indicated they had later become aware 
that the rule they provided as an explanation directly 
contradicted some of their responses. 74.4% of participants 
said that they felt their approach to the task changed as the 
experiment progressed. When asked if they had any further 
comments about the experiment, 71.0% said “no”. However, 
the remaining 29.0% asked if all the problems had the same 
answer. This shows that whilst some of the participants 
suspected that the answers may all be the same due to the 
similar structure, perceptions based on their own 
experiences were so powerful that they overrode these 
suspicions. The fact that the problems used in this 
experiment were essentially the same basic problem with 
different surface features shows how vulnerable 
associatively-mediated retrieval is to a change in the surface 
features of a problem.  
 
Implications 
 
The findings in this study suggest that when participants 
are presented with problems, such as the ones in this study, 
memories are elicited first and rules are inferred later. These 
findings may have significant implications for education. If 
experiences are primary to predicting the answer of basic 
physics problems, this needs to be factored into the teaching 
methods applied to physics. For instance, children who are 
studying GCSE Physics are likely to have already formed 
many memories about the behaviour of moving objects, and 
because they are likely to believe things that they see with 
their own eyes rather more than what they are told (Wallach, 
1987) this will need to be taken into account. Just telling 
them the correct theory may not be enough; some explicit 
acknowledgement of their own experience and why it might 
be misleading in terms of the physics of the situation may be 
required. 
 
Strengths and Limitations 
 
This study has successfully replicated McLaren et al.’s 
(2013) findings using an improved methodology, whereby 
participants underwent the study in a controlled 
environment and were able to provide both quantitative data 
and qualitative data. The results of this study provide strong 
evidence for the case that associative memory plays an 
important role in problem solving and learning. However, 
one limitation of this study is the method of obtaining 
incongruent problems. The problems which were designed 
to elicit responses incongruent with the naive physics theory 
(i.e. curved forwards responses for carried objects and 
straight down responses for free-moving objects) were 
selected based solely on the research team’s own experience 
of how the objects appear to behave. It would be useful for 
future research to find a more independent method of 
selecting incongruent problems. Another limitation of the 
study could be that it lacks ecological validity due to the use 
of images of two-dimensional objects on a computer 
monitor rather than real-life objects. 
 
It is possible that some propositional theorists may argue 
that this study does not provide evidence for the primary 
role of associative memory in problem solving. Mitchell et 
al. (2009) allow that associative memory may have a role in 
learning. However, they believe it is propositional reasoning 
that elicits memories based on previous experience and 
extracts a rule from them. Therefore, it could be argued that, 
although the responses appear to be based on the 
participants’ past experiences, it is conscious, propositional 
reasoning that enables the participants to apply these past 
experiences to the problems presented in the study. 
Although this alternative explanation covers most of the 
facts, it cannot easily explain the pattern of qualitative 
results found in this study. Participants’ inconsistent 
explanations for their responses suggest that they responded 
to each problem automatically and later came up with a 
post-hoc justification to fit the response they had given, 
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even if their justification directly contradicted an 
explanation they had given for a previous problem. At the 
end of the experiment, many participants indicated that they 
had later become aware that their explanations directly 
contradicted some of their responses. This shows that 
perceptions based on their own experiences were so 
powerful that they overrode any logic. 
 
Directions for Future Research 
 
As pointed out earlier, the experiment involves people 
predicting the path of objects drawn in two-dimensional 
images on a computer monitor. Although the results of this 
experiment are highly significant, it is important to find out 
whether the findings can be generalised to other more 
practical contexts. A possible extension of this study 
involves participants predicting the path of falling objects in 
real-life situations. For instance, a student running with a 
book along a corridor marked with a tape measure. The 
student could initially run without dropping the book to give 
participants a real-life illustration. The experimenter would 
then explain to the participant that the student will drop the 
book at a specified point the next time he runs along the 
corridor and ask them to indicate where they expect the 
book will fall. This may result in more accurate responses 
due to greater ecological validity. Alternatively, the 
scenarios could be presented using a video recording.  
 
This study could be extended by running the experiment 
with a number of samples of participants from different age 
groups, academic disciplines, professions, or demographics, 
in order to determine whether the results can be generalised 
to different groups of participants. It would also be 
interesting to run the experiment with children in different 
developmental stages. Although younger children will have 
less experience with falling objects, they are likely to rely 
more on automatic associative memory because, according 
to Piaget (1972), they will not yet have developed the ability 
to apply a theory when solving problems. However, 
interestingly, some research has found evidence for children 
as young as 5 years old applying what appears to be a naïve 
physics theory to basic physics problems (Blown & Bryce, 
2013; Kaiser, Proffitt & McCloskey, 1985; Vosniadou, 
2002). It would be interesting to explore this further. 
 
Another possible direction for future research is to study 
the transition from associatively-based to rule-based 
performance when solving basic physics problems. This 
could be achieved by firstly running the initial experiment 
with a group of participants to get a set of responses based 
on associative memory, and then training the same group of 
participants on Newtonian mechanics before running the 
experiment (using different problem variants) with them 
again. In the second trial, the participants would presumably 
respond correctly to the problems because they would be 
able to apply a rule they had recently learnt. This may sound 
straightforward, but note that most of the participants in this 
study had some knowledge of physics, and still made 
systematic errors. 
 
Conclusion 
 
In conclusion, this study has provided strong evidence for 
the primary role of associative memory in human learning 
and problem solving. The highly reliable results show that 
people are frequently incorrect in their predictions of the 
paths of moving objects, highlighting the importance of 
studying associative processes in humans and their 
interaction with more cognitive (propositional) processing. 
We suspect that our results will have practical implications 
for education, especially instruction in physics and applied 
mathematics. 
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